People injured by the negligence of others are usually entitled to damages, subject to certain exceptions. One of the exceptions that often arises is the situation where a person is injured due to the alleged negligence of a charitable organization or its agent.
People who are injured due to the dangerous condition of property owned by a charitable organization or due to the negligence of those working on behalf of a charitable organization can often find themselves without recourse for the damages sustained.
New Jersey Statute 2A:53A-7 sets forth the standard by which a claim of charitable immunity is to be analyzed by our courts. The statute states that nonprofit corporations, societies and associations organized for exclusively religious, charitable or educational purposes, and the agents of such organizations, are not liable for damages to any person who suffers damages due to the negligence of any agent of the organization where the injured person is a beneficiary of the works of the corporation.
The immunity does not apply where the person suffering injury is not a beneficiary of the charitable works of the organization. Our courts have held that the immunity granted by this statute is to be construed liberally so as to afford immunity in furtherance of the public policy of protecting charitable organizations.
The statute makes it clear that non-profit organizations organized for purposes other than religious, charitable or educational purposes are not afforded the immunity. Furthermore, the grant of immunity is conditional, not automatic, and is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To be afforded the protection of the statute, the organization seeking immunity must demonstrate that it was formed for non-profit purposes, is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes AND was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to the plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works.
An injured person is considered to have been a beneficiary of the charity when he receives a benefit from the functioning of the organization at the time of the incident. Beneficiary status does not depend upon a showing that the injured person personally received a benefit from the works of the charity, but rather whether the organization was engaged in the performance of charitable objectives it was organized to advance at the time of the injury.
So, for example, a person who rents a room at the local YMCA who is injured in the premises will likely be without recourse against the YMCA, because the YMCA is a non-profit organization created for charitable purposes and its housing services have been found by our courts to bear a substantial and direct relationship to the YMCA’s general charitable purpose. Despite the foregoing, it should be noted that charitable organizations that charge a fee for services to non-members to generate profits for the organization’s charitable purposes cannot rely upon the immunity granted by statute.
Therefore, a fee paying non-member of the YMCA injured at a ski area operated by the YMCA was found by our courts to have the right to pursue her tort claim. Likewise, our courts have found that a non-congregation member attending a bingo game at a synagogue could pursue her claim for injuries incurred when a table at which she was sitting collapsed.
Clearly, the issue of whether charitable immunity applies in any given situation is greatly dependent upon the relationship between the charity and the injured person. One should not simply assume that all non-profits are immune from suit for injuries caused by the non-profit’s negligence. Nor should one simply assume that a cause of action is viable against a non-profit. These types of cases must be presented to an experienced attorney capable of analyzing the facts and law in order to avoid both the filing of frivolous litigation and the mistake of not filing suit where a valid cause of action exists.